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Abstract Electoral competition in weak institutional settings has been shown to increase
criminal violence, in particular homicides. Electoral competitiveness, by virtue of threat-
ening the ability of incumbents to maintain informal corruption agreements with criminal
networks, is argued to increase crime because of violent competition among criminal
groups over future influence. We link elections to maritime piracy, a form of criminal
behavior that has increased substantially since the end of the Cold War and for which
cross-national, temporally and spatially disaggregated data are available. We argue that
electoral competition reinforces piracy because political changes threaten to disrupt col-
lusive agreements between pirates and government authorities. Anticipating a disruption of
criminal activity, pirates elevate their attack rates before political changes undermine these
agreements. This disruption effect suggests that jurisdictions holding competitive electoral
contests should experience more maritime piracy. We test our hypothesis on electoral
competitiveness and piracy with subnational data for the 1999 and 2004 elections in
Indonesia. Our results show that piracy escalates in proximity to highly competitive
electoral districts.
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1 Introduction
Elections in unstable or formerly illiberal regimes often are accompanied by significant
political and criminal violence, which has potentially deleterious consequences for
democratic consolidation. The political science literature has linked elections to various
types of political violence, yet comparatively little work has explored whether elections
influence the activities of criminal groups, i.e., violence without clear political goals.
Important contributions by Villarreal (2002) and Hoelscher (2015) argue that the prospect
of electoral competition induces violent bargaining between criminal groups over future
influence. Evidence from Mexico and Brazil shows that elections, especially if competi-
tive, increase the incidence of homicides (Hoelscher 2015; Villarreal 2002). However, we
do not know whether these findings on homicides hold for other types of crime or in other
national and regional contexts. In this paper, we hypothesize a link between elections and
maritime piracy, a form of crime that has yet to be connected authoritatively to electoral
processes. We argue that competitive elections are associated with more piracy because
political rivalry threatens to disrupt existing collusion between criminal actors and local
elites. Evidence from Indonesia supports this conjecture.
Our paper makes three contributions to research on competitive elections and violence.
First, we provide one of the first systematic, subnational assessments of the relationship
between electoral competition and piracy. Some observers note that piracy increased
during Indonesia’s first democratic elections in 1999 (e.g., Amirell 2008), but do not
explore it further.1 Gaibulloev and Sandler (2016) examine the effect of decentralized
governance on piracy, including the holding of bottom-tier elections, but do not assess the
explanatory power, if any, of electoral competitiveness. We use subnational data on
electoral competition and piracy for the first two democratic elections in Indonesia, held in
1999 and 2004, to examine that link systematically. Our findings show that offshore areas
close to competitive electoral districts experience more piracy. In addition, cross-national
analyses covering the 1993–2010 period establish a positive effect of electoral competition
on piracy for a global sample. While these latter results are weaker, both analyses suggest
that piracy is linked to electoral processes, which broadens the empirical relevance of the
election-crime link. Second, we extend existing work on elections and crime by estab-
lishing how the anticipated disruption of governing coalitions by competitive elections
increases criminal activity. A limitation of the emphasis on homicides in existing work is
that murder rates are seen as indicators of competition among criminal groups rather than
criminal activity itself, which often remains unobservable. In the case of piracy, attacks
indicate actual criminal activity (as well as competition between groups), allowing us to
explore the effects of elections on crime more generally. We argue that elections threaten
to disrupt existing patronage networks between pirates and politically relevant actors,
producing incentives to increase piratical activity around elections before political changes
1 Based on data from the Maritime Piracy Event and Location Data (MPELD), Indonesia experienced 140
incidents from 1995 to 1997, compared to 304 from 1998 to 2000, which includes the 1999 elections
(Daxecker and Prins 2015a).
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could disrupt their relationships, but also to signal pirates’ influence to local elites. This
supply-centered argument suggests that piracy increases around elections, especially if
competitive, which we corroborate in empirical analyses. A third contribution of our paper
stems from the nature of the piracy data. Such information is based on reports from crew
members, ship owners, and government authorities, which should make them less prone to
over reporting during election periods than the media-based data commonly used in studies
of political violence (Earl et al. 2004). An additional advantage is that piracy is unlikely to
conflate criminal and political violence; distinguishing the two is more challenging with
data on homicides.
We proceed as follows. We first review the literature on elections and political and
criminal violence. We then develop our theory hypothesizing a disruption effect. Our
empirical section consists of a subnational analysis of piracy in the 1999 and 2004
Indonesian elections. Robustness tests, including a cross-national analysis, confirm the
importance of competitive elections as triggers of piracy.
2 Elections and violence
Elections offer peaceful means for contesting political offices, yet are often accompanied
by significant violence. A growing literature links elections to low-level civil unrest,
government repression, ethnic conflict, civil war and terrorism.2 Research suggests that
electoral processes in weakly institutionalized settings produce political violence because
the stakes are high, incumbents are concerned about holding onto power, and fragile
political structures may not safeguard elite interests (Fjelde and Ho¨glund 2016; Hafner-
Burton et al. 2014; Salehyan and Linebarger 2014). Others suggest a more nuanced
relationship, arguing that weaker incumbents prefer using violence, while stronger ones use
nonviolent forms of manipulation (Chaturvedi 2005; Collier and Vicente 2011). In con-
trast, Wilkinson’s (2006) analysis of India argues that ethnic violence is less common when
partisan competition is more intense because incumbents must cater to minority votes.
Work on terrorism also emphasizes the use of violence to disrupt electoral processes or
overthrow the status quo (Staniland 2014). Newman (2012) finds that terrorist incidents
peak around election time, particularly in dictatorships, while Aksoy (2014) shows that
terrorism increases around elections only in democracies with low levels of electoral
permissiveness (i.e., low electoral system proportionality).
In comparison, the literature on elections and criminal violence is much less developed.
If electoral competition in weakly institutionalized political environments fosters violence
because it threatens elites’ hold on power, then such competition similarly should threaten
criminal networks fearing disruption by regime change. Collusion with political actors is
crucial for the long-term viability of criminal organizations (Bailey and Taylor 2009), and
impending upheavals threatened by electoral competition could thus lead to more criminal
activity and violence. Villareal (2002), for example, argues that electoral competition and
its potential to disrupt patron-client relations leads to greater homicidal violence in
Mexico. Consistent with this expectation, he shows that rural municipalities, where voter
support for the incumbent party was weaker, experience higher homicide rates. Similarly,
Hoelscher (2015) hypothesizes that political competition threatens to disrupt coercive
institutions used to protect political advantage and thus is linked to greater violence.
2 Related research examines how political violence, in particular terrorism, influences electoral processes
(Berrebi and Klor 2006; Gould and Klor 2010).
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Municipal-level results from Brazil confirm the connection between elections, competi-
tiveness, and homicidal violence (Hoelscher 2015). Outside of Latin America, Alesina
et al. (2016) establish that electoral cycles lead to higher homicide rates in regions dom-
inated by the Mafia. While focused on party structures rather than elections, Moro et al.
(2016) argue that party fragmentation reduces criminal violence because it provides
multiple access points for criminal organizations. Based on Italian evidence, Mafia killings
rise during times of single-party dominance but fall when governance is fragmented. Moro
et al.’s (2016) findings seem consistent with a competition effect—crucially, criminal
activity increases when actors fear that their ability to engage in crime will be constrained.
More generally, evidence on crime and elections also is consistent with arguments linking
democratization to criminal violence, especially in the Latin American context (Grillo
2012; Kalyvas 2015).
In contrast, other researchers hypothesize a political crime cycle and argue that elections
can be crime-reducing since political elites have incentives to crack down on criminals in
the run-up to elections to convince voters they are ‘‘tough on crime’’ and raise their
chances of reelection (Ghosh 2006; Gordon and Huber 2002; Meloni 2012). While this
argument hinges on the assumption that concerns about crime are highly salient for voters,
subnational analyses of Argentina and India in Meloni (2012) and Ghosh (2006) show a
reduction in crime before elections because of more vigorous enforcement, although this
effect is absent for violent crime.
The following section elaborates our mechanism linking elections to maritime piracy, a
form of criminal behavior that has increased substantially since the 1990s.
3 Electoral competition and maritime piracy
Maritime piracy reemerged as a common form of criminal violence with the end of the
Cold War. Compared to other crimes, such as robberies, rape, or homicides, piracy is
geographically more limited since it occurs at sea or in ports. Yet piracy nevertheless
affects many coastal states. Between 1993 and 2014, 97 of 177 states with coastlines
experienced at least one piracy incident, 47 states experienced more than 10 incidents, and
13 states experienced more than 100 pirate attacks. Conceptually, many piracy incidents
(particularly those occurring in ports) may be closest to armed robbery, although piracy can
involve significant violence against crewmembers (or the threat thereof) and may also
involve the capture of crewmembers, the hijacking of ships, or both, and then bargaining
for ransom with foreign ship owners. Maritime piracy thus may be perpetrated by indi-
viduals engaging in sporadic, isolated acts, but can also involve small and medium-sized
groups with substantial, hierarchical organizational structures (Hastings 2012). With two
important exceptions (Gaibulloev and Sandler 2016; Shortland and Varese 2015), the
scholarship on piracy has not yet examined whether electoral processes influence the
behavior of pirate organizations.3 Existing research largely has focused on the roles played
by weak institutions and the lack of legal employment opportunities in creating permissive
conditions for piracy (Axbard 2015; Daxecker and Prins 2013, 2015b; Hastings 2009;
Jablonski and Oliver 2013). We theorize a supply-side mechanism, arguing that elections
influence pirates’ incentives to engage in and to expand their criminal activities.
3 Using cross-national and subnational data, Gaibulloev and Sandler (this issue) show that the holding of
regional elections reduces piracy. We focus on the consequences of electoral competitiveness for piracy
rather than the presence or absence of elections.
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Drawing on the extant literature linking elections and criminal violence, we expect that
competitive elections threaten to disrupt agreements between pirate groups and local elites.
Collusion between pirates and local governing authorities frequently has been identified as
essential for the flourishing of pirate organizations since such connections help stabilize the
environment in which pirates operate (Hastings 2012; Hastings and Phillips 2015; Murphy
2009; Shortland and Varese 2014). Hastings (2012, p. 689), for example, observes that
incidents in the South China Sea essentially disappeared once the Chinese government
cracked down on pirate-government collusion. Empirical studies of piracy in Africa and
Southeast Asia have shown the importance of pirate group connections—whether through
payoffs or other arrangements—with government actors (Hastings 2012; Hastings and
Phillips 2015; Pe´rouse de Montclos 2012; Shortland and Varese 2014). In Indonesia, for
example, corrupt customs officials, port employees, or crew members were known to
provide information on ship movements and cargo manifests to pirates (Storey 2008).
Further, during the New Order era in Indonesia, ties between criminal actors and various
levels of the state bureaucracy served as a form of regime maintenance (Wilson 2006,
p. 266). Given these connections between pirate organizations and local elites, pirates (and
other criminals) might be concerned about the potential disruption of such networks by
elections. These effects are particularly likely in areas where elections are competitive,
especially so in the regions where pirates are active. Concerns about major political
changes triggered by elections should thus translate into larger numbers of attacks because
pirate groups are unsure about their future ability to manage operations.4 .
In contrast to existing work on elections and crime, we do not anticipate that pre-
election increases in piracy can be explained by pirate groups competing violently with one
another over future political influence on government officials in electorally competitive
areas. Nor do we think that such violence primarily is meant to suppress competing pirate
groups. While some of the rise in piracy may be the result of more vigorous intergroup
competition, we also believe that pirates elevate their attacks because they fear electoral
interruption of their connections with incumbent politicians and public officials. This
supply-centered argument focuses on the bargaining relationship between local political
elites and pirate organizations. The threat to target ships travelling to and from a country’s
port facilities provides leverage with local officials who fear disruption of ship traffic. Port
charges remain important sources of government revenue in many countries and shipping
companies rationally avoid sea lanes and anchorages where the risk of piracy is too high. In
principle, a stable equilibrium rate of piratical activities maximizes both profits for pirates
and rents for local elites.
The rate of pirate attacks is a choice variable for pirate organizations. Elevating the
frequency of piracy demonstrates local pirate groups’ prowess and increases leverage in
bargaining and collusion around election time, especially if a new regime is expected to
prevail at the polls. On the other hand, pirate groups will maintain the status quo ante level
of violence if incumbents are expected to win. Piracy thus is thus expected to rise before
4 An observationally equivalent explanation would be that voters punish incumbents who are unable to
reduce crime, leading to a negative association between victory margins and piracy. We think this is unlikely
for two reasons. First, we do not think that voters’ perceptions of the government’s counterpiracy efforts
matter early on in the democratization process because citizens are preoccupied with other issues. For
example, in a survey of Indonesian citizens following that nation’s first democratic elections, only 7 % of
respondents identified crime as a significant concern, while the overwhelming majority thought economic
issues were more important (Wagner 1999). Moreover, unlike other crimes, such as theft, robbery, or
murder, piracy is less likely to affect negatively the daily lives of a large number of voters because its
main targets are international or domestic ships, not small fishing vessels.
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and during competitive elections because those groups carry out more attacks in order to
capture more prizes before their activities can be disrupted by a new governing regime, or
to strengthen their bargaining positions with the incumbent regime if political equilibrium
has not yet been reached.
In addition to the threat of disruption, pirate groups could also use income from piracy
to support their preferred candidate(s). Research on Somalia has connected hijacked ship
and crewmember ransoms to collusion between local politicians and pirates (Shortland and
Varese 2015). A share of attack-generated revenue flows into the pockets of political elites
who use the funds for campaign activities.5 After elections, piracy may continue at higher
rates if the incumbent or the incumbent party loses office, leading to more piracy until new
elites assume or consolidate power. Our first hypothesis thus specifies a direct effect of
electoral competition on piracy.
Hypothesis 1 Electoral competition increases the incidence of piracy.
The foregoing theoretical rationale suggests that piracy should increase when electoral
competition threatens current collusive agreements. In particular, these implications should
hold during transitional periods when major political changes threaten existing patronage
networks (Villarreal 2002). Once electoral competition becomes more routine and insti-
tutionalized, voter evaluations of incumbents’ performance on crime may start to fig-
ure more prominently, which is why we expect that the empirical implications of our
arguments are most pronounced in the immediate democratization period. The hypothe-
sized association between elections and piracy could decline or even disappear once
democracy is more established.
4 Elections and piracy in Indonesia
We test the empirical implications of our arguments with subnational data on the 1999 and
2004 Indonesian elections and piracy. A disaggregated analysis has several advantages,
including allowing for an assessment of the effects of both national and regional elections,
accounting for subnational differences in the competitiveness of elections, and fully
considering the spatial variation in piracy incidents.
We choose Indonesia as the case for subnational analyses for two reasons. First, we
purposely choose a country with pervasive piracy since the implications of our arguments
should be most apparent where pirates are active historically and where organized piracy is
present. Indonesia has experienced some of the most extensive and entrenched maritime
piracy in the world, events that provide a testing bed for our argument expecting an
escalation of criminal activity brought about by political changes (rather than elections
causing piracy in the first place).6 Second, the 1999 and 2004 elections are useful cases
with regard to effects of electoral competition on criminal behavior. Before the fall of
Suharto in 1998, elections were not competitive and should not have affected Indonesian
5 The disruption mechanism emphasizes local and regional actors, suggesting that elections with important
local or regional consequences should be more likely to trigger increases in piracy. In subnational analyses
for Indonesia, we distinguish legislative and regional elections, and find effects for both. Our cross-national
robustness tests include only national elections, not all of which may have important local-level effects, thus
biasing the analysis against finding the hypothesized relationship.
6 Twenty-five percent of the incidents in the MPELD database from 1993 to 2014 occur in or near
Indonesian waters.
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piracy materially. The 1999 and 2004 legislative elections were the first two democratic,
multi-party elections in more than five decades and this prospect should have influenced
the behavior of pirate organizations as hypothesized in our theory.7 State patronage during
the Suharto regime permeated many layers of the government bureaucracy, including a
symbiotic relationship between street-level criminals and military, political, and social
elites (Wilson 2006, p. 266). The threat that political changes would disrupt those networks
for pirate and other criminal actors thus was substantial. Importantly, both the 1999 and the
2004 elections led to major political realignment.
The 1999 legislative elections resulted in the defeat of the incumbent party Golkar
(Suharto’s party) by the newly formed opposition Indonesian Party of Struggle (PDI-P) in
18 of 34 provinces. Yet in the 2004 legislative elections, disappointment with the refor-
mists produced victory for Golkar and the defeat of the PDI-P in a majority of Indonesia’s
provinces, meaning that both elections had significant consequences for criminal actors
concerned with access to elites. While existing research on Indonesia has linked elections
to piracy only anecdotally as being the result of changes in patronage networks (Amirell
2008), other work has pointed to the importance of political protection for criminal activity
in that country (Choi 2007; Wilson 2006). Scholars also have noted that surges in criminal
violence, including robberies, extortion, and gang violence, coincided with the end of the
Suharto era (Welsh 2008; Wilson 2006).
Since subnational analyses of a single case do not allow for generalizing, we also
present cross-national analyses of elections and piracy in robustness tests (Table 3).
5 Research design
5.1 Data and variables
Our unit of analysis for Indonesia consists of Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) grids
(55 9 55 km cells) within Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) (Tollefsen et al.
2012).8 Exactly 2340 grids fall within Indonesia’s EEZs, which extends (up to) 200
nautical miles from its coastline. We choose Indonesia’s EEZs rather than territorial waters
since most accounts suggest that piracy in this area is committed by home-grown
Indonesian pirates (Nautilus Institute 2007). Moreover, we add 27 grids in the Malacca
Straits, lying outside of Indonesia’s EEZs, since observers attribute these incidents to
Indonesian pirates (Nautilus Institute 2007).
Our dependent variable measures the number of piracy incidents one year before,
during, and after the 1999 and 2004 elections (i.e., 1998–2000 for the 1999 elections and
2003–2005 for the 2004 elections). To make sure that the inclusion of post-election piracy
events does not drive these results, we also estimate a model omitting events in the year
after elections (Model 2). Data for maritime piracy, the main dependent variable, come
from the Maritime Piracy Event and Location Data (MPELD) (Daxecker and Prins
7 We focus on legislative elections because Indonesia did not have direct presidential elections until 2005.
Legislative elections also are likely to have more significant local-level implications than presidential
elections. Research on Indonesia highlights the important local and national-level role played by political
parties, such as Golkar and the PDI-P (Slater 2004).
8 PRIO GRID is available at http://grid.prio.org/#/download. EEZ shapefiles come from http://www.
marineregions.org/downloads.php. ArcGIS 10.3 was used to create the dataset and to calculate distance
controls.
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2015a).9 These data include piracy incidents from the International Maritime Bureau
(IMB). Using MPELD, we calculate the sum of piracy incidents for each EEZ grid in
Indonesia. The variable ranges from 0 to 35, and 4 % of all grids experience one or more
incidents. Our estimation method is negative binomial regression because our dependent
variable is an event count with over-dispersion. We include grid-clustered standard errors
in all regressions.
To test hypothesis 1, our key independent variables measure subnational electoral
competition. We use province-level election results from the Global Elections Data for the
1999 elections (Brancati 2014) and constituency-level election results from the Con-
stituency Level Election Archive (CLEA) for the 2004 elections (Kollman et al. 2011).10
We then calculate the margin of victory in each of the 34 provinces for the 1999 elections,
and each of the 70 constituencies for the 2004 elections, respectively. The margin of
victory is calculated by subtracting the second-place party’s votes from those of the winner
and then dividing this number by total votes in each province/district. Smaller values thus
indicate more competitive elections. Because elections happen on land and piracy at sea (or
in ports), we use ArcGIS to create buffers of the margin variable that extend to all EEZ
grids. We then calculate average values for margin buffer variables for all grids. Margins
range from 0.03 to 0.48. The map in Fig. 1 shows Indonesia’s provinces with election
victory margins (with lighter shades representing smaller margins) and Indonesian EEZ
grids for the 1999 elections. The black dots denote piracy incidents from 1998 to 2000.
Figure 2 provides the same information for the 2004 elections. Indonesia’s con-
stituencies are shown with election victory margins (with lighter shades representing
smaller margins) and surrounding EEZ grids. The black dots show piracy incidents from
2003 to 2005. We note that piracy persists in some regions, in particular Riau, despite only
intermediate levels of electoral competition in 2004.
Data for several control variables come from the PRIO GRID, version 2.0 (Tollefsen
et al. 2012). To control for economic development, we include data on nighttime light
emissions for the year before elections for all grids in Indonesia. For nighttime lights, we
use a similar procedure with buffers as described for elections above.11 We do not include
additional controls for GDP or population because these variables correlate extremely
highly at the ocean grid level (p[ 0.95). We control for the number of ports on grids
bordering Indonesia because access to ports is likely to be associated with greater pirate
activity.12 We include data for rainfall in grids in the year before elections because
excessive rains could reduce the potential for piracy, again creating buffers because the
PRIO GRID does not include information for ocean grids.
We also control for average temperatures in the year before elections since higher
temperatures could result in more crime. We include the distance between each grid and
the coast as a standard control in all models. The statement that the origins of piracy are
land-based is now a cliche´ in the piracy literature, but suggests that grids at greater
9 In line with the IMB definition, incidents are counted if they meet UNCLOS’s definition of piracy or the
IMO’s definition of armed robbery.
10 For the 1999 elections we are limited to provinces, the first-order administrative units, because neither
GED nor CLEA have more disaggregated results. Because CLEA does not provide a shapefile of the 77
constituencies in Indonesia, we created one ourselves by geo-referencing constituencies with maps available
at the following website: http://www.seasite.niu.edu/indonesian/Indonesian_Elections/Districts04.htm.
11 DMSP OLS Nighttime Lights, data from http://ngdc.noaa.gov/eog/dmsp/downloadV4composites.html.
12 Observations are taken from the World Port Index, available at http://msi.nga.mil/NGAPortal/MSI.
portal?_nfpb=true&_pageLabel=msi_portal_page_62&pubCode=0015.
382 Public Choice (2016) 169:375–393
123
distances from the coast experience less piracy. The distance variable measures the kilo-
meter distance between each grid and Indonesia’s coastline, which we calculate in ArcGIS.
The variable ranges from 0 (for grids adjacent to Indonesia’s coast) to 369 km.
Fig. 1 Indonesia EEZ PRIO grids: 1999 election margins and piracy incidents
Fig. 2 Indonesia EEZ PRIO grids: 2004 election margins and piracy incidents
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Furthermore, we include a dummy coded 1 for the 67 grids adjacent to the Malacca Straits
(again calculated in ArcGIS), a major shipping chokepoint creating opportunities for
piracy. Even a visual inspection of Figs. 1 and 2 makes the strong effect of this chokepoint
on piracy in proximate grids apparent. We account for the temporal and spatial dependence
of piracy. For temporal dependence, we calculate the average number of incidents in
MPELD in each grid for 3 years preceding the measurement of our dependent variable
(1995–1997 for the 1999 elections and 2000–2002 for the 2004 elections). For spatial
dependence, we calculate a spatial lag of piracy based on grid contiguity. The variable
ranges from 0 to 7 and measures whether the incidence of piracy in contiguous grids
influences the risk of piracy in each cell. A final control variable is a dummy for the year
2004 to account for temporal variation in the incidence of piracy between elections in our
dataset.
5.2 Results
Figure 3 presents a coefficient plot with two models of competitiveness and piracy in the
1999 and 2004 elections (see Table 1 for full results below). Model 1 includes the measure
for victory margins in legislative elections. The coefficient is negative and significant, thus
showing that piracy declines in proximity to less electorally competitive elections. This, in
turn, supports Hypothesis 1. The results for controls are in line with expectations from the
literature. Grids further away from the coast are less likely to experience piracy. We also
find evidence of temporal and spatial dependence. Grids in years before elections are at
greater risk of piracy. The spatial lag also is positive and significant, indicating spatial
diffusion of piracy. Grids bordering the Malacca Straits likewise experience more piracy,
as expected. Similar to findings for other crimes, we find that higher average temperatures
increase piracy. We find no statistical significance for nighttime lights, although it is not
clear that findings for economic opportunities from country-level studies have similar
implications within states. It may be that poorer countries attract more individuals to
Fig. 3 Coefficient plot of elections and piracy in Indonesia, models 1–2
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piracy, but within such countries, pirates likely need to be close to areas of economic
activity to find targets, i.e., ports with ships. The fact that the ports variable is positive and
significant lends supports to this conjecture. We do not find an effect for rainfall.
In Model 2, we limit our dependent variable to piracy incidents in the year before
elections (i.e., 1998 and 2003) and the election year itself (i.e., 1999 and 2004). Arguably,
a post-election effect of political competitiveness on piracy should be conditional on
whether the incumbent lost office. The coefficient for victory margins remains negative and
significant, again showing that larger electoral margins are associated with less piracy.
Hence, our results are not conditional on controlling for post-election incidents.
Hypothesis 1 indicates a direct effect of electoral competition on piracy, regardless of
where piracy happens. Since piracy occurs at sea while elections take place on land, the
effect of electoral competition on piracy nevertheless likely declines with distance. For
piracy far removed from the coast, it becomes much more difficult to establish where the
attacks originated and a link between electoral competition and piracy hence is less
plausible. Expecting the effect of electoral competition to be stronger in grids closer to the
coast, we therefore compare the effect of victory margins on piracy for close and far away
distances. Figure 4 plots the predicted probability of piracy for grid-coast distances of 0
(grids adjacent to the coast) and 180 km, which corresponds to values of one standard
deviation below and above the mean.
The solid line in Fig. 4 indicates the effect of victory margins for grids adjacent to the
coast (distance = 0), while the dashed line shows the effect of margins for grids at one
standard deviation above the mean of distance (distance = 180 km). The results are
consistent with our expectations: Larger election margins reduce piracy in grids contiguous
to the coast (solid line), whereas the effect is absent for grids farther away (dashed line).
The rug plot of victory margins at the bottom of the left panel also shows that this effect
covers empirically relevant cases. Table 1 presents coefficients for both models.
Table 1 Event count regression of piracy and elections in Indonesia
(1) (2)
DV = Piracy t, t - 1, t ? 1 DV = Piracy t, t - 1
Margins, legislative -3.297* (1.455) -3.184* (1.611)
Distance to coast -0.012* (0.002) -0.012* (0.002)
Ports 0.674* (0.201) 0.715* (0.240)
Year = 2004 -0.091 (0.234) 0.327 (0.254)
Malacca, dummy 1.808* (0.298) 1.180* (0.311)
Night lights 6.895 (4.339) 7.592 (5.000)
Temperature 0.241* (0.063) 0.176* (0.070)
Precipitation -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001)
Piracy lag, MA 1.883* (0.423) 2.017* (0.389)




Standard errors clustered on grids in parentheses
* p\ 0.05; ? p\ 0.1
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6 Robustness tests
We present two sets of robustness tests. We first specify additional models for Indonesia to
account for alternative explanations, other operationalizations of electoral competitiveness,
dynamic controls, and an alternative definition of the dependent variable. Our second
robustness test uses a cross-national, yearly research design to show that a relationship
between electoral competitiveness and piracy is not limited to Indonesia.
6.1 Additional model specifications for Indonesia
Table 2 presents results for additional models. Models 3 and 4 assess an important alter-
native explanation for a relationship between electoral competition and piracy, which
suggests that political elites, law enforcement, and the security apparatus are preoccupied
with the electoral process and hence reduce their attention to crime during elections. This
distraction argument implies that crime in electorally competitive areas increases not
because criminals anticipate disruption of their activities or signal their influence, as we
argue, but rather because actors usually involved in combating crime focus their attention
elsewhere. While both explanations would expect a relationship between electoral com-
petitiveness and piracy, claims about distraction also suggest that elites would shift their
attention to the most contentious and unstable areas, in particular those experiencing
political violence.13 If the distraction argument is valid, electoral competition should lead
to more crime in areas where elites focus little attention on it (i.e., areas far from political
violence), but reduce crime in areas experiencing political violence, where elites pre-
sumably pay attention. Conversely, if our arguments about disruption effects hold, we
would expect that proximity to political violence has little effect on the relationship we
hypothesized. Controlling for proximity to electoral violence should make it more difficult
Fig. 4 Effect of victory margins on piracy, varying grid-coast distance ±1 SD (model 1)
13 Models controlling for political violence also help to address whether our results simply pick up a more
generally unstable environment in electorally competitive regions.
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for the electoral competition-piracy relationship to survive since this variable is more
consistent with the distraction argument.
In Model 3, we include a dummy variable indicating proximity to election violence on
land. We use data from the Electoral Contention and Violence (ECAV) project (Daxecker
and Amicarelli 2016) to calculate whether a grid is within 75 km of a land-based electoral
violence event in 1999 or 2004. We present two models, one in which we control for the
proximity to political violence, and another in which we interact victory margins with
proximity. As the results of estimating model 3 show, the margins variable remains neg-
ative and significant even when we control for proximity to election violence, which
suggests that distraction does not fully explain the competition-piracy link. In Model 4, we
also interact victory margins with proximity to election violence. Of concern to our
inferences would be if the effect of electoral competition on piracy is strong in grids far
away from political violence, but absent in grids experiencing such violence, since this
would be most consistent with claims of distraction. The interaction term is not statistically
significant, thus not supporting the alternative explanation.
Model 5 examines whether electoral competition captures preexisting regional condi-
tions, correlated with victory margins.14 If, for example, regional differences in state
capacity correlate with electoral competitiveness, those preexisting factors might explain
the empirical relationships rather than our hypothesis. We examine this possibility indi-
rectly by redefining our dependent variable to include only piracy events several years
before elections (1995–1997 for the 1999 elections and 2000–2002 for the 2004 elections).
We argue that election margins have an independent effect on piracy, rather than simply
reflecting historical factors such as lower or higher state capacity in less or more electorally
competitive regions. If our argument is correct, victory margins should have no significant
effect on piracy occurring several years before. If on the other hand margins continue to
have a negative and significant effect on piracy, they might indeed capture historical
factors correlated with victory margins. As model 5 shows, the coefficient for victory
margins is insignificant, thus making it unlikely that historical factors, rather than margins
themselves, are responsible for the empirical relationship we establish in this article.
Model 6 includes a measure of electoral competitiveness in provincial rather than
legislative elections. We are limited to 1999 data for provincial elections because we could
not locate those data for 2004, which is why our main models use legislative election
results. Theoretically, it makes sense to expect the strongest empirical relationship for
elections with the most local implications, as our discussion of connections between pirates
and local elites has emphasized. For the 1999 provincial elections, we therefore calculate
the margin of victory, which ranges from 0.03 to 0.47. As the results show, we find that
larger margins reduce piracy in provincial elections, corroborating our findings from
legislative elections.
14 An alternative explanation focuses on the demand for criminal violence by political elites. Similar to
claims about election violence as a form of manipulation, a demand-centered argument would expect that
political elites incite piracy to make their opponents appear incapable and influence voter’s decisions at the
ballot box. For example, Perouse de Montclos (2012, p. 536) describes how politicians in the Niger Delta
hired pirates to demonstrate the federal government’s and regional governor’s inability to maintain order in
the run-up to the 2011 general elections in Nigeria. Crucially, this argument hinges on voters evaluating
candidates with respect to to their performances on crime. As we mention above, we do not think that
citizens are preoccupied with crime early on in the democratization process and, moreover, piracy is a type
of criminal activity less likely to prey on ordinary citizens. While we would like to confirm our intuition
empirically, survey data on citizen perceptions of crime in Indonesia do not provide information on
respondent location for the time analyzed herein (email correspondence with Asiabarometer staff).
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In Model 7, we include first differences of measures for night lights, temperature, and
rainfall instead of yearly levels, thus capturing how changes in these controls could affect
the rate of attacks, compared with static measures. Because of the lagged dependent
variable, static measures make it difficult to assess our control variables’ effects on piracy.
We use data from the PRIO GRID to calculate first differences for controls. In Model 7,
victory margins remain negative and significant. For first-differenced controls, only the
increases in rainfall are significant, showing that such increases are associated with less
piracy. Model 8 uses a dummy dependent variable instead of the count to ensure that the
relatively small number of grids with a large number of piracy events and does not
influence our results. In model 8, the margins variable continues to be negative and
significant.
6.2 Cross-national analyses
We present results from cross-national analyses to demonstrate that the elections-piracy
relationship holds more generally than in the Indonesian case. These cross-national anal-
yses have several disadvantages, including being limited to national elections, losing
significant subnational variation in the competitiveness of elections, and aggregating piracy
to the country-level. Furthermore, while we expect our empirical implications to hold most
strongly in transitional periods, the cross-national dataset includes both transitional and
routine elections in established democracies. For these reasons, we expect weak findings
but hope to establish some support for Hypothesis 1. The unit of analysis in our cross-
national analyses is the country-year.
We use data from MPELD to create our dependent variable, which is a count of piracy
incidents attributed to each country per year.15 We use negative binomial estimation
because the dependent variable is an event count with over-dispersion. Additionally, we
use fixed-effects estimation to account for observational heterogeneity. Employing fixed
effects also means limiting our sample to coastal states experiencing at least one piracy
incident during 1993–2010. Our theoretical mechanism outlines how the incidence of
competitive elections affects the strategic considerations of existing criminal actors rather
than producing new criminal groups; hence it makes sense to presuppose piracy as a viable
option.
Our main independent variables focus on electoral competitiveness. Our first inde-
pendent variable is a dummy indicating whether a competitive election was held in a
particular country-year. We lag elections by one year to capture increases in piracy in
anticipation of competitive elections. Data for competitive elections come from the
National Elections in Democracies and Autocracies dataset (NELDA) (Hyde and Marinov
2012). Second, we add data on the effective number of parties as a proxy for the com-
petitiveness of the electoral system. Wilkinson (2006), for example, uses party fraction-
alization as an indicator of competitiveness. Data on the number of effective parties come
from Teorell et al. (2015) and Bormann and Golder (2013). The variable is lagged by one
year, so we do not estimate the effect of elections on fractionalization. While we would
have preferred to use data on victory margins, they either are not available in existing
15 We assigned pirate incidents to states if they occurred within 12 nautical miles of coastlines, to the
country from which the pirates originate (if indicated in the IMB report), or to the coastal country closest to
the pirate incident for incidents beyond 12 nautical miles. We used ArcGIS to assign incidents to individual
countries.
Public Choice (2016) 169:375–393 389
123
datasets on elections (e.g., NELDA), or available only with lots of missing observations
(e.g., V-Dem).16
We control for a variety of factors that likely also affect piracy, including state capacity,
GDP per capita, the number of ports per country, population, coastline length, average
yearly rainfall and temperatures, and temporal dependence. We use data on government
effectiveness from the World Bank Governance Indicators to control for state capacity
(Kaufmann et al. 2009). Data on per capita GDP and population also come from the World
Bank. Port data are again from the World Port Index. Coastline length (in km) comes from
the CIA Factbook and is time invariant. We control for climate factors with average
temperatures and average precipitation; the information is taken from the World Bank.17
We control for temporal dependence with a three-year moving average of the dependent
variable. Finally, we include year dummies to account for temporal heterogeneity. The
independent variables are lagged by one year unless specified otherwise.
Table 3 presents results for fixed effects negative binomial regressions. In model 9, we
include the dummy variable for competitive elections coded 1 for election years and 0
otherwise. We see a weakly significant positive effect of elections on piracy for this
variable (z = 1.95). In model 10, we enter the party fractionalization variable instead of
the elections dummy. This variable is positive and significant, indicating that countries
with more fractionalized party systems experience more piracy, which is consistent with
our expectations.
Table 3 Cross-national event count regression of maritime piracy, 1993–2010
(9) (10)
Elections dummy Party fractionalization
Competitive election 0.087? (0.045)
Party fractionalization 0.072* (0.033)
Ports 0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002)
Government effectiveness -0.006 (0.005) -0.012? (0.007)
Coastline, logged 0.033 (0.155) 0.427 (0.321)
GDP per capita -0.180 (0.136) -0.046 (0.267)
Population 0.453* (0.111) 0.566* (0.198)
Temperature -0.017 (0.061) -0.040 (0.080)
Precipitation 0.011* (0.002) 0.011? (0.006)
Lag of piracy, MA 0.007* (0.002) 0.009* (0.003)
N 1001 473
Country FE yes yes
Year FE yes yes
AIC 2302.886 1072.368
BIC 2415.788 1168.028
* p\ 0.05; ? p\ 0.1
16 After calculating victory margins with data from V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2015), we retained only 182
observations.
17 http://data.worldbank.org/developers/climate-data-api.
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7 Conclusion
An emerging literature links elections to criminal violence, in particular homicides (Ale-
sina et al. 2016; Hoelscher 2015; Moro et al. 2016; Villarreal 2002). Our paper is the first
to examine whether electoral competitiveness creates or reinforces incentives for maritime
piracy. An empirical focus on piracy has several advantages: Piracy constitutes a type of
criminal activity that is more easily distinguishable from political violence than, for
example, homicides; it allows for observing criminal activity rather than principally
competition among criminal actors; and cross-national data that are spatially and tempo-
rally disaggregated are available for piracy.
We theorize that elections increase piracy because of disruption effects, expanding on
existing theories focusing primarily on intergroup competition. Pirates, like other criminal
actors, depend on agreements with local law enforcement agents, coast guards, or elected
officials to maintain flourishing businesses. In consequence, the prospect of political
changes brought about by competitive elections (and the possibility of changes in the
governing regime) can induce pirates to increase criminal activity to signal their influence,
compete with rival actors, and engage in piracy before new actors take office. Our
empirical models use disaggregated data on electoral competitiveness and piracy for the
1999 and 2004 elections in Indonesia. As that nation’s first democratic elections, they are
well-suited for an empirical test of our arguments. The results show that close electoral
contests increase the risk of piracy, particularly in grids close to the coast. These results
remain consistent across a number of robustness tests. Importantly, we also find a positive
effect of competitive elections on piracy in a sample of all nation-states around the globe
experiencing at least one piracy incident. The evidence thus supports theories suggesting
that elections increase criminal activity generally, while the scarcity of cross-national
crime data limited previous work to single case studies.
These findings help put research positing a link between elections and non-political
violence on more solid grounds. We establish a relationship for elections and piracy, a
form of criminal activity not examined before. Our results also align with research on the
connections between democratization processes and criminal violence (Grillo 2012). While
that research has focused primarily on Latin America, we show that the adoption of
competitive elections can increase crime in other nations and regions. Democratization
may nevertheless have long-term positive implications for stability. While we demonstrate
some short-term negative effects of the introduction of democratic processes, we expect
their crime-inducing effects to fade over time. Once elections become routinized and
citizens come to evaluate politicians on their performances in office, corruption and
combating crime, the impacts of elections on crime should become weaker or even
disappear.
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